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REALIGNING PARTIES
Debra Lyn Bassett* & Rex R. Perschbacher**
Abstract
The doctrine of realignment—which permits a federal court to
change a party’s litigating position from plaintiff to defendant or vice
versa—has been virtually ignored in federal procedure scholarship. This
stark neglect is genuinely astonishing because the federal circuit courts
are split as to the appropriate standard. The source of the standard—
and the circuit courts’ confusion—is a 1941 U.S. Supreme Court
decision, City of Indianapolis v. Chase National Bank. In that decision,
rather than focusing on realignment’s purpose, the Supreme Court
focused unduly on the specific context in which the realignment issue
arose. The result was a muddled articulation of the appropriate
standard.
Realignment’s purpose lies in assuring the necessary adversarial
context mandated by Article III’s references to “cases” and
“controversies”—but City of Indianapolis makes no mention of the caseor-controversy requirement in either the majority or dissenting opinions.
Instead, the Court erroneously and confusingly defined its analysis
within the specific diversity-jurisdiction context in which the
realignment issue arose. This analytical error resulted in a perplexing
and misguided standard and contributed to the common misperception
that the doctrine of realignment is only applicable to diversity cases.
Had the City of Indianapolis Court properly analyzed the
realignment doctrine according to its purpose, its analysis would have
mirrored that in declaratory judgment cases. An identical concern
underlies both the doctrine of realignment and declaratory judgment
actions—i.e., ensuring the existence of a case or controversy—and
therefore the same standard should apply in the realignment context:
whether there is a substantial controversy between parties having
adverse legal interests.
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INTRODUCTION
In federal court, one is not always confined to the hand she is dealt. In light of
the axiom that the plaintiff is the master of her claim,1 and in light of the reality
that the plaintiff drafts the complaint and thereby designates the plaintiffs and
defendants, we tend to assume that the plaintiff’s configuration of who is suing
whom is accurate. Less known is a federal concept of long historical standing, the
doctrine of realignment,2 which authorizes federal courts to change a plaintiff to a
defendant, or vice versa. The federal courts do not often invoke this doctrine; the
case law analyzing the topic is sparse,3 and scholarly treatment borders on
nonexistent.4 This lack of attention to the doctrine of realignment is surprising due
to realignment’s pedigree, which ordinarily would tend to generate extensive legal
commentary. Realignment is a constitutionally grounded procedure and was
validated in a U.S. Supreme Court decision authored by Justice Frankfurter5—a
decision that has resulted in a circuit-court split in attempting to identify the
appropriate test.6
The source of the circuit courts’ confusion is a 1941 Supreme Court decision,
City of Indianapolis v. Chase National Bank.7 In that case, the Supreme Court
focused unduly on the specific context in which the realignment issue arose, rather
than focusing on realignment’s purpose, resulting in a muddled articulation of the
appropriate standard.
Realignment’s purpose lies in assuring the necessary adversarial context
mandated by Article III’s references to “cases” and “controversies”—but City of
1

Despite the lack of scholarly commentary, it is well accepted that, among the choices
available under the law, plaintiffs have the initial choice of the judicial system (federal or
state, depending on the limits of subject-matter jurisdiction); the parties who will join as
plaintiffs; the parties to be named as defendants (assuming personal jurisdiction is available
for court process to reach them); and the place of trial (venue). The Supreme Court has
acknowledged this plaintiffs-choice system. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235,
241–42 (1981); Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 344 (1960). In addition, plaintiffs are
able to take advantage of any jurisdiction in which the action can be brought and where the
statute of limitations against the plaintiff’s claim has not run, even if only one such state
remains. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 778–80 (1984).
2
As a general matter, to “realign” means “to readjust alliances or working
arrangements between or within.” WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1193
(4th ed. 2008). Similarly, the doctrine of realignment authorizes the federal courts to
change a lawsuit’s configuration such that a party plaintiff becomes a party defendant or
vice versa.
3
See infra note 20 (noting that the number of federal cases addressing the realignment
doctrine averages only approximately five per year).
4
See infra note 8 (citing the three law-review articles and two case notes that have
addressed the doctrine of realignment).
5
City of Indianapolis v. Chase Nat’l Bank, 314 U.S. 63, 69–70 (1941).
6
See infra note 46 (discussing the split in the circuit approaches to realignment).
7
314 U.S. 63 (1941).
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Indianapolis makes no mention of the case-or-controversy requirement in either
the majority or dissenting opinions. Instead, the Court erroneously and confusingly
defined its analysis within the diversity-jurisdiction context in which the
realignment issue arose. This analytical error resulted in a perplexing and
misguided standard and contributed to the common misperception that the doctrine
of realignment is only applicable to diversity cases.
Had the City of Indianapolis Court properly analyzed the realignment
doctrine according to its purpose, the analysis would have mirrored that in
declaratory judgment cases. An identical concern underlies both the doctrine of
realignment and declaratory judgment actions—ensuring the adversity necessary
to satisfy the Article III case-or-controversy requirement—and therefore the same
standard should apply in both contexts: whether there is a substantial controversy
between parties having adverse legal interests.
This Article analyzes the neglected federal doctrine of realignment. Part I
demonstrates that realignment is not restricted to diversity cases; it also applies in
cases based on arising-under jurisdiction. Part II examines the Supreme Court’s
treatment of realignment in its seminal City of Indianapolis decision. Part III
analyzes the flaws in the reasoning of that decision and reestablishes the doctrinal
foundation of the doctrine. Part IV analyzes realignment’s ultimate purpose and
underpinnings, which lie in the Constitution’s case-or-controversy requirement.
Finally, Part V proposes that in evaluating whether realignment is appropriate,
federal courts should use the same standard employed in declaratory judgment
actions, thus finding realignment improper when the facts reflect a substantial
controversy between parties having adverse legal interests.
I. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DOCTRINE OF REALIGNMENT
There would be little sense in writing about the doctrine of realignment if
every analytical angle had already been thoroughly explored by others. The
relative lack of attention given to this doctrine by the legal academy, however,
makes our task a bit different. Accordingly, we begin by explaining how this
Article differs from the existing commentary, and why—contrary to a recent call
for its abolition—the doctrine of realignment serves an important, constitutionally
based purpose.
It appears that every law review article analyzing the doctrine of realignment
has focused on that doctrine’s relationship to a procedural concept unique to the
federal courts: diversity jurisdiction.8 Certainly realigning the parties to a lawsuit
8

See, e.g., William A. Braverman, Janus Was Not A God of Justice: Realignment of
Parties in Diversity Jurisdiction, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1072, 1077–1100 (1993) (discussing
at length the Founders’ rationales for diversity jurisdiction, the modern debate over
diversity, diversity’s impact on the federal courts, Congress’s treatment of diversity, and
Justice Frankfurter’s personal dislike of diversity jurisdiction); April N. Everette, United
States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. A&S Manufacturing Co.: Realignment of Parties in
Diversity Jurisdiction Cases, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1979, 1984 (1996) (describing the doctrine
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has the potential to destroy complete diversity of citizenship, thus depriving the
federal court of the subject-matter jurisdiction required to hear the case when no
federal question exists. Although the doctrine of realignment can thus play a
crucial role in whether the court can exercise diversity jurisdiction, it is a mistake
to characterize realignment as serving exclusively that role.
Despite the legal commentary’s pointed focus on realignment in the context
of diversity jurisdiction, the federal courts have expressly, and repeatedly, held
that realignment is not limited to diversity cases. “Although realignment questions
typically arise in the diversity of citizenship context, the need to realign a party
whose interests are not adverse to those of his opponent(s) exists regardless of the
basis for federal jurisdiction.”9 In Wade v. Mississippi Cooperative Extension
Service,10 for example, the plaintiffs sued the Mississippi Cooperative Extension
Service and various state and federal governmental entities for discrimination
under federal-question jurisdiction.11 When the U.S. Justice Department
subsequently intervened as a plaintiff, a question arose as to whether the federal

of realignment as “necessarily intertwined with diversity jurisdiction”); Jacob S. Sherkow,
A Call for the End of the Doctrine of Realignment, 107 MICH. L. REV. 525, 529–31, 541–
45, 553–59 (2008) (discussing the history of diversity jurisdiction, characterizing
realignment as a question of jurisdiction, and ultimately positing that realignment is
unnecessary because the improper joinder statute can be used to thwart any improper
invocation of diversity jurisdiction). Two other articles are case notes and thus merely
discuss the results in a single court decision, although both are again in the diversity
context. See generally Moulton A. Goodrum, Jr., Federal Jurisdiction—Corporations—
Realignment of Corporation as Affecting Diversity Jurisdiction in a Stockholder’s
Derivative Suit—Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91 (1957), 36 TEX. L. REV. 238 (1957);
Recent Cases, Federal Courts—Diversity of Citizenship—Realignment of Parties in
Determining Jurisdiction, 40 HARV. L. REV. 1015 (1927) (discussing Franz v. Buder, 11
F.2d 854 (8th Cir. 1926)); see also 15 JAMES W. MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE
§§ 102.20, 102.21[6], 63–64, 86 (3d ed. 2013) (discussing realignment only in the diversity
context); 16 JAMES W. MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE §§ 107.14[2][c][vi], 101 (3d
ed. 2013) (same); 13E CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE, § 3607, 303–40 (3d ed. 2009) (same).
9
Larios v. Perdue, 306 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1195 (N.D. Ga. 2003); see also id. at 1197
(“[T]he need to assess the alignment of parties is equally strong in federal question cases
like this one as it is in those premised on diversity jurisdiction.”); Dev. Fin. Corp. v. Alpha
Hous. & Health Care, Inc., 54 F.3d 156, 159 (3d Cir. 1995) (“[W]e must consider
[realignment of parties] a fundamental principle of federal jurisdiction, a principle
associated with, but not limited to, diversity jurisprudence.”); In re Tex. E. Transmission
Corp. PCB Contamination Ins. Coverage Litig., 15 F.3d 1230, 1242 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting
that the district court had “erroneously reasoned that realignment was a principle associated
exclusively with diversity jurisdiction”); Seminole Cnty. v. Pinter Enters., Inc., 184 F.
Supp. 2d 1203, 1209 (M.D. Fla. 2000) (“Realignment does not only apply to diversity
cases.”).
10
528 F.2d 508 (5th Cir. 1976).
11
See id. at 510.
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court should realign the other federal defendants as plaintiffs.12 Noting the
applicability of the doctrine of realignment in federal-question cases,13 the Fifth
Circuit observed:
[I]t is difficult to see how the interests of one department of the
government, which had implicitly or explicitly given support and
sanction to the various policies of [the Mississippi Cooperative
Extension Service] over the years, could be identical with the interests of
another department of the government, which was asserting that those
very policies were discriminatory and in violation of the law.14
Recognizing that the doctrine of realignment applies to federal cases
generally, rather than solely to diversity cases, frees it to perform its essential
constitutional function of ensuring there is an actual case or controversy. This
recognition also renders largely irrelevant the focus on diversity-based issues in
the existing realignment scholarship, such as the Founders’ rationales for
diversity15 and whether diversity’s rationales are enduring.16 This recognition
similarly renders irrelevant the focus on diversity-based proposals in the existing
realignment scholarship. For example, 28 U.S.C. § 1359, which addresses
collusive or improper joinder in diversity cases,17 does not serve as a basis for
abolishing the doctrine of realignment18 because it is inapplicable to party
alignment in cases not based exclusively on diversity. Other justifications for
abolishing the doctrine of realignment by using concepts of fraudulent joinder and
expanding the concept of a “direct action” against insurers19 also become
irrelevant with the recognition that realignment is not restricted to the diversity
context.
Realignment’s ultimate purpose is to ensure that parties are on the proper side
of the litigation. Motions to realign the parties are relatively few in number,20
12

Id. at 521.
Id. (“Although the correctness of a realignment of parties is an issue that normally
arises only in the context of diversity jurisdiction cases, the principles applicable to those
cases are equally so here [where federal jurisdiction is predicated on the existence of a
federal question].”).
14
Id. at 521.
15
Braverman, supra note 8, at 1078–83.
16
Id. at 1082–86.
17
Section 1359 provides that “[a] district court shall not have jurisdiction of a civil
action in which any party, by assignment or otherwise, has been improperly or collusively
made or joined to invoke the jurisdiction of such court.” 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (2006).
18
Jacob Sherkow has offered this argument, see Sherkow, supra note 8, at 553–56,
558–59.
19
Jacob Sherkow has offered these diversity-based arguments, see Sherkow, supra
note 8, at 558–59.
20
A Westlaw search of all published federal decisions from January 1, 2004, to
January 1, 2014, using the Allfeds database and the search terms “‘Indianapolis v. Chase’ &
13
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suggesting that the doctrine is neither creating extensive jurisdictional abuses nor
burdening the federal courts. Moreover, realignment serves an important
constitutional purpose in ensuring the adversity necessary to the constitutional
case-or-controversy requirement. Even if the need arises only in a relatively small
number of cases, the approach employed to determine whether realignment is
appropriate in a given instance is critical to the doctrine’s proper implementation.
Before we turn to our approach, however, it is worth looking at the Supreme
Court case that created the mistaken view that realignment’s value is limited to the
diversity context. Thus, we now turn to the Supreme Court decision from which
current realignment tests are drawn.
II. REALIGNMENT AND THE SUPREME COURT
The history of the doctrine of realignment is long in time but relatively short
in discussion. Its foundation was set in the Supreme Court’s 1941 decision, City of
Indianapolis v. Chase National Bank.21
City of Indianapolis did not create the doctrine of realignment; indeed, City of
Indianapolis cites to earlier realignment decisions of both the Supreme Court and
lower federal courts.22 However, City of Indianapolis’s focus on, and analysis of,
the doctrine of realignment constitutes the Court’s greatest guidance on this
subject. Unfortunately, by focusing on different portions of the City of
Indianapolis majority opinion, the circuit courts are divided as to whether to
analyze realignment pursuant to the “substantial controversy” test or the “principal
purpose” test.
In City of Indianapolis, Chase National Bank sued the City of Indianapolis,
Indianapolis Gas Company, and Citizens Gas Company.23 Chase was the trustee
under a mortgage deed to secure a bond issue executed by Indianapolis Gas.24
Indianapolis Gas subsequently entered into a ninety-nine-year lease conveying all
its property to Citizens Gas, pursuant to which Citizens Gas agreed to assume the
realign!” yielded 157 cases. Thus, on average over this ten-year period, the entire federal
court system heard only 15.7 cases per year involving realignment. This result is actually
higher than that found by Jacob Sherkow during a previous ten-year period. See Sherkow,
supra note 8, at 528 n.12 (reporting the use of the same Westlaw search process for the
years 1998–2008 with a yield of only 79 cases, an average of 7.9 realignment cases per
year). And if one divides the total number of realignment cases since City of Indianapolis
(see infra note 122, finding 362 federal cases) by the 73 years since the 1941 decision, the
average is only 4.96 cases per year.
21
314 U.S. 63 (1941).
22
See id. at 69–70 (“These familiar doctrines governing the alignment of parties for
purposes of determining diversity of citizenship have consistently guided the lower federal
courts and this Court.”). For examples of Supreme Court and lower federal court cases
looking at alignment cases, see id. at 70 nn.1–2, 75 n.4.
23
Id. at 68.
24
Id. at 70.
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payments to Chase of the interest on the bonds.25 Twenty-two years later, Citizens
Gas conveyed its entire property, including the property leased from Indianapolis
Gas, to the City of Indianapolis.26 When the City refused to honor the terms of the
lease between Citizens Gas and Indianapolis Gas, Chase sued all three entities,
seeking a declaration that the lease between Indianapolis Gas and Citizens Gas
was binding on the City of Indianapolis, and also seeking an order that the City
perform the lease obligations, including paying Chase the required interest
payments.27
The City of Indianapolis and Citizens Gas denied that they were bound by the
lease and alleged that the controversy actually lay between Indianapolis Gas and
the City.28 The federal district court realigned the parties, moving Indianapolis Gas
from defendant to plaintiff.29 Under some circumstances, this party realignment
might have been unremarkable. However, Chase had sued the three defendants in
federal court, and the basis for federal subject-matter jurisdiction was diversity.30
Chase was a New York citizen,31 but realigning Indianapolis Gas as a plaintiff
meant that now there was an Indiana plaintiff and Indiana defendants, thus
destroying complete diversity and requiring the lawsuit’s dismissal for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction.32
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed, finding realignment improper.33 The
Seventh Circuit opined that realignment is only appropriate when the parties are in
substantial accord on all of the issues presented, not merely when the parties agree
on one issue or some of the issues.34 On remand, the district court held that the
lease was not enforceable against Citizens Gas or the City of Indianapolis, and it
entered judgment only against Indianapolis Gas for the interest payments owed to
Chase.35
On a second appeal to the Seventh Circuit, the appellate court again reversed,
finding that the lease was valid and that the assignment did not relieve Citizens
Gas of its lease obligations.36 Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit concluded, Chase

25

Id.
Id. Citizens Gas had been created in 1906, and its franchise provided for its
eventual conveyance to the City of Indianapolis, subject to its “outstanding legal
obligations.” Id.
27
Id. at 71.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
See id. at 68–69.
31
Id. at 68.
32
Id. at 68, 71.
33
Chase Nat’l Bank v. Citizens Gas Co., 96 F.2d 363, 367 (7th Cir. 1938).
34
Id.
35
City of Indianapolis, 314 U.S. at 72.
36
Chase Nat’l Bank v. Citizens Gas Co., 113 F.2d 217, 232 (7th Cir. 1940).
26
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was entitled to a declaratory judgment that the lease was valid and enforceable
against the parties.37 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.38
Ultimately the Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit in a five-to-four
decision, holding that the district court’s original realignment had been proper and
that the realignment divested the federal courts of jurisdiction.39 But the Court’s
conclusion is of less interest than its analysis in reaching that conclusion.
Consistent with realignment’s long history but paucity of discussion, the
Supreme Court’s summation is easily set forth:
Diversity jurisdiction cannot be conferred upon the federal courts by the
parties’ own determination of who are plaintiffs and who defendants. It
is our duty, as it is that of the lower federal courts, to look beyond the
pleadings and arrange the parties according to their sides in the
dispute. . . . Whether the necessary collision of interest exists, is
therefore not to be determined by mechanical rules. It must be
ascertained from the principal purpose of the suit and the primary and
controlling matter in dispute.40
In applying these concepts to the dispute in City of Indianapolis, the majority
opinion offered a two-part analysis. First, the majority characterized the lawsuit as
turning on the validity of the lease, thus concluding that the lease’s validity was
the principal purpose of the lawsuit:
The facts leave no room for doubt that on the merits only one
question permeates this litigation: Is the lease whereby Indianapolis Gas
in 1913 conveyed all its gas plant property to Citizens Gas valid and
binding upon the City? This is the primary and controlling matter in
dispute. The rest is window-dressing designed to satisfy the
requirements of diversity jurisdiction. Everything else in the case is
incidental to this dominating controversy, with respect to which
Indianapolis Gas and the City, citizens of the same state, are on opposite
sides. . . . Chase and Indianapolis Gas have always been united on this
issue: both have always contended for the validity of the lease and the
City’s obligation under it.41
Second, the majority noted that with respect to the issue of the lease’s
validity, the interests of Indianapolis Gas were aligned with Chase rather than with
the City of Indianapolis:
37

Id.
City of Indianapolis, 314 U.S. at 72.
39
See id. at 74–75.
40
Id. at 69 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
41
Id. at 72–73 (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
38

2014]

REALIGNING PARTIES

117

Chase and Indianapolis Gas are, colloquially speaking, partners in
litigation. The property covered by the lease is now in the City’s
possession; Chase is simply acting to protect the bondholders’ security.
As to Indianapolis Gas, if the lease is upheld, it will continue to receive
a six per cent return on its capital, and the burden of paying the interest
on its bonded indebtedness will be not upon it but upon the City. What
Chase wants Indianapolis Gas wants and the City does not want. Yet the
City and Indianapolis Gas were made to have a common interest against
Chase when, as a matter of fact, the interests of the City and of
Indianapolis Gas are opposed to one another.42
Four Justices dissented in City of Indianapolis, describing the majority’s
realignment as “radical” and observing that the majority “forces into the position
of co-plaintiff one party which the District Court adjudged entitled to recover over
a million dollars and another which the District Court adjudged solely liable to
pay that sum.”43
With this basic background, we turn to an analysis of the flaws in the
rationale of the City of Indianapolis majority opinion that undermine its approach
to realignment and have created confusion among the circuits.
III. SMOKE GOT IN THEIR EYES: THE FLAWS IN THE CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS
MAJORITY OPINION
In this Part, we examine the City of Indianapolis majority opinion more
closely and analyze the flaws that undermine its approach to realignment. Our
analysis discusses the majority opinion’s focus on realignment in the specific
context of diversity jurisdiction and examines the cases upon which the City of
Indianapolis majority relied. We conclude that the majority unduly focused on the
diversity-jurisdiction context in which the realignment issue arose—a focus that
may have been motivated by Justice Frankfurter’s personal opposition to diversity
jurisdiction—and that the majority appears to have stretched its cited precedents
to support realignment based on a principal-purpose theory.
A. The Majority Opinion and Diversity Jurisdiction
Any analysis of the doctrine of realignment must consider City of
Indianapolis. As a practical matter, no circuit court could simply disregard the
Supreme Court’s decision, and the Supreme Court itself would have to
acknowledge City of Indianapolis even if it sought to overrule it. Although we
have summarized the case above,44 we here offer a sharpened analysis.
42

Id. at 74.
Id. at 78–79 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
44
See supra notes 21–43 and accompanying text.
43
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As we have seen, the City of Indianapolis majority stated that diversity
jurisdiction’s “governing principles” required an “actual” and “substantial”
controversy and that the “necessary collision of interests . . . [must] be ascertained
from the principal purpose of the suit and the primary and controlling matter in
dispute.”45 Subsequent federal circuit court decisions, of course, all recognize City
of Indianapolis as controlling. However, by focusing on different language within
the majority opinion, the circuits have split into two camps: some circuits have
adopted the “substantial controversy” test; others have adopted the “principal
purpose” test.46
Pursuant to the substantial-controversy test, so long as there is an actual or
substantial conflict between adverse litigants, the federal court will not realign the
parties.47 In contrast, the principal-purpose test requires a court to determine which
issue “permeates [the] litigation”—the “dominating controversy” to which
“[e]verything else in the case is incidental” or mere “window-dressing.”48 Pursuant
to the principal-purpose test, the federal court must sort through the issues within
the lawsuit, determine the lawsuit’s principal purpose, and align the parties
according to their positions with respect to that particular issue. Determining the
litigation’s principal purpose not only requires a substantive inquiry, but it also
potentially requires the court to engage in speculation.49 The result is that the
principal-purpose test is simultaneously more complicated in its analysis and
narrower in its satisfaction than the substantial-controversy test: it is easier to find
a “substantial controversy” between parties within the lawsuit generally than to

45

City of Indianapolis, 314 U.S. at 69 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see supra note 40 and accompanying text.
46
The Second, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits employ the substantial-controversy test.
See Md. Cas. Co. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 23 F.3d 617, 622 (2d Cir. 1994) (referring to the
substantial-controversy test as “a broader ‘collision of interests’ test” and adopting that
test); Am. Motorists Ins. Co. v. Trane Co., 657 F.2d 146, 151 (7th Cir. 1981); Universal
Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Wagner, 367 F.2d 866, 870 (8th Cir. 1966). The Third, Fourth,
Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits apply the principal-purpose test. See U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co.
v. A&S Mfg. Co., 48 F.3d 131, 132 (4th Cir. 1995); U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Thomas
Solvent Co., 955 F.2d 1085, 1089 (6th Cir. 1992); Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau v. Crown Cork &
Seal Co., 905 F.2d 42, 45 (3d Cir. 1990); Zurn Indus., Inc. v. Acton Constr. Co., 847 F.2d
234, 236 (5th Cir. 1988); Cont’l Airlines, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 819 F.2d
1519, 1523 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Saylab v. Hartford Mut. Ins. Co., 271 F. Supp. 2d 112,
116 (D.D.C. 2003) (using the substantial-controversy test).
47
E.g., Trane, 657 F.2d at 149 (“Realignment is proper when the court finds that no
actual, substantial controversy exists between parties on one side of the dispute and their
named opponents . . . .”).
48
City of Indianapolis, 314 U.S. at 72.
49
See id. at 80 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (observing that the primary purpose of the
litigation “depends on the outcome of the litigation” and thus cannot be known at the
litigation’s outset); Sherkow, supra note 8, at 542 (stating that the principal purpose
determination “is invariably one of substance”).

2014]

REALIGNING PARTIES

119

demonstrate that such a substantial controversy exists within the “principal
purpose” of the litigation specifically.50
Two issues underlie the competition between the substantial-controversy and
principal-purpose tests. First, the City of Indianapolis majority clearly did not
intend to create two alternative standards—the majority was presenting a linear
progression of thought in which determining the actual and substantial controversy
required an examination of the lawsuit’s principal purpose. In other words, the
majority was presenting a single test, rather than providing two alternative, equally
acceptable tests. Second, the majority’s analysis focused unduly on the specific
diversity-jurisdiction context in which the realignment issue arose.
The language in City of Indianapolis, from which the federal circuit courts
have drawn their competing approaches to realignment, is found within a single
paragraph. The paragraph opens with a discussion of the governing principles of
diversity jurisdiction,51 and does not refer to “alignment” until the paragraph’s
final sentence. The repeated references to diversity jurisdiction are distracting
because they seem to suggest that the “standards” discussed in that paragraph
reflect diversity requirements rather than realignment requirements. This approach
reflects the majority’s erroneous focus on tying realignment specifically and
exclusively to diversity jurisdiction rather than acknowledging its applicability to
federal cases more generally, regardless of the basis for federal subject-matter
jurisdiction.52
Diversity was the basis for federal subject-matter jurisdiction in City of
Indianapolis,53 and certainly the Court was acutely aware that its decision to
realign the parties in this instance would destroy the necessary complete diversity
of citizenship.54 However, the majority’s fixation on the diversity-jurisdiction
context of City of Indianapolis is the source of the opinion’s flaws.

50

See John B. Oakley, Fiat Lux, 51 DUKE L.J. 699, 709 n.25 (2002) (noting that the
principal-purpose test “favors realignment,” whereas the substantial-controversy test
“generally defers to the structure of the litigation as framed by the complaint”).
51
City of Indianapolis, 314 U.S. at 69 (“To sustain diversity jurisdiction there must
exist an ‘actual,’ ‘substantial’ controversy between citizens of different states, all of whom
on one side of the controversy are citizens of different states from all parties on the other
side.” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)) .
52
Id. (“The specific question is this: Does an alignment of the parties in relation to
their real interests in the ‘matter in controversy’ satisfy the settled requirements of diversity
jurisdiction?” (emphasis added)); see also id. at 70 (“These familiar doctrines governing
the alignment of parties for purposes of determining diversity of citizenship have
consistently guided the lower federal courts and this Court.”). The majority returned to
diversity at the end of its opinion, noting the constitutional and statutory boundaries of the
federal courts’ diversity jurisdiction, as well as the necessity for a “strict construction” of
the diversity jurisdiction statute to comport with “Congressional policy.” Id. at 76–77
(quoting Healy v. Ratta, 293 U.S. 263, 270 (1934)).
53
Id. at 68–69.
54
Id. at 74–77.
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The historical purpose behind diversity jurisdiction is unclear,55 and its utility
has long been controversial.56 The continued necessity for diversity jurisdiction
has been hotly debated on many occasions,57 generating extensive commentary in
the legal literature.58 Justice Frankfurter participated actively in this debate, and
55

See H.R. REP. NO. 95-893, at 2 (1978) (“The debates of the Constitutional
Convention are unclear as to why the Constitution made provision for [diversity]
jurisdiction; nor is pertinent legislative history much aid as to why the First Congress
exercised its prerogative to vest diversity jurisdiction in the Federal courts.”); see also
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 8, § 3601, at 12 (“Neither the debates of the Constitutional
Convention nor the records of the First Congress shed any substantial light on why diversity
jurisdiction was granted to the federal courts by the Constitution or why the First Congress
exercised its option to vest that jurisdiction in the federal courts.”); Henry J. Friendly, The
Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REV. 483, 484–87 (1928) (noting the
records of the Constitutional Convention provide little help in determining the reasons
behind the diversity clause).
56
See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 8, § 3601, at 20–22 (“[T]he question of what
purpose is served by diversity jurisdiction has retained its controversial character over the
years. Time only has exacerbated the disagreements stirred at the time of the ratification
debates.”); Friendly, supra note 55, at 487 (“On no section of the new Constitution was the
assault more bitter than on the provisions for the federal judiciary. . . . [D]iversity of
citizenship jurisdiction came in for its share of criticism.”); James William Moore &
Donald T. Weckstein, Diversity Jurisdiction: Past, Present, and Future, 43 TEX. L. REV. 1,
1 (1964) (“While there are other segments of federal jurisdiction as old as diversity,
probably none is as controversial. From the beginning, proposals have been made to abolish
or substantially curtail diversity jurisdiction and many words have been written in support
of, or in opposition to, such proposals.”); id. at 3–4 (“The lack of recorded opposition in
the Constitutional Convention should not be taken as an indication of complete acceptance
of diversity jurisdiction. Sharp attacks were soon launched in the state ratifying
conventions, the first Congress, and the press.”).
57
See Larry Kramer, Diversity Jurisdiction, 1990 BYU L. REV. 97, 98 (noting that
“[e]very administration since President Carter’s, the Judicial Conference, the American
Law Institute, state courts, numerous public interest and legal aid organizations, and most
legal scholars support the abolition or curtailment of diversity”).
58
See, e.g., Robert C. Brown, The Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts Based on
Diversity of Citizenship, 78 U. PA. L. REV. 179, 193 (1929) (supporting diversity
jurisdiction); David P. Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute, 36 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1, 4–8 (1968) (supporting limits on diversity jurisdiction); John P. Frank, For
Maintaining Diversity Jurisdiction, 73 YALE L.J. 7, 7–9 (1963) (supporting diversity
jurisdiction); John P. Frank, The Case for Diversity Jurisdiction, 16 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
403, 406 (1979) (arguing that, due to diversity’s longevity, it should not be altered without
a compelling reason); Robert W. Kastenmeier & Michael J. Remington, Court Reform and
Access to Justice: A Legislative Perspective, 16 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 301, 314 (1979)
(stating that diversity jurisdiction is “an idea whose time has passed”); Adrienne J. Marsh,
Diversity Jurisdiction: Scapegoat of Overcrowded Federal Courts, 48 BROOK. L. REV.
197, 201–05 (1982) (supporting the continuing operation of diversity jurisdiction); Thomas
D. Rowe, Jr., Abolishing Diversity Jurisdiction: The Silver Lining, 66 A.B.A. J. 177, 180
(1980) (supporting abolition of diversity jurisdiction); David L. Shapiro, Federal Diversity
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his disdain for diversity jurisdiction is well documented.59 We are not the first to
posit that his personal opposition to diversity jurisdiction might have played a role
in his approach to realignment in City of Indianapolis.60
Of course, if the analysis and rationale in City of Indianapolis were correct,
then Justice Frankfurter’s personal opinions regarding diversity jurisdiction
become a largely irrelevant historical aside. But Justice Frankfurter’s analysis is
problematic, as we shall see.
B. The Majority’s Use of Precedent in City of Indianapolis
City of Indianapolis did not purport to overrule any of the Supreme Court’s
prior decisions nor to create a new test for determining when realignment is
proper.61 Indeed, the majority opinion cited to six prior Supreme Court decisions
in its summary discussion of the realignment standard.62 One of those decisions,
Jurisdiction: A Survey and A Proposal, 91 HARV. L. REV. 317, 317 (1977) (proposing that
“the decision to retain, curtail, or abolish diversity jurisdiction should be made by each
judicial district individually”); Charles Alan Wright, Restructuring Federal Jurisdiction:
The American Law Institute Proposals, 26 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 185, 194–98 (1969)
(arguing that diversity jurisdiction should be severely limited). See generally Debra Lyn
Bassett, The Hidden Bias in Diversity Jurisdiction, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 119, 119–36 (2003)
(detailing the historical background of diversity jurisdiction).
59
Felix Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State
Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 521–22 (1928) (arguing that there are no longer valid
reasons for diversity jurisdiction); see also Felix Frankfurter, A Note on Diversity
Jurisdiction—In Reply to Professor Yntema, 79 U. PA. L. REV. 1097, 1097 (1931) (urging
the legislature to remove “some obvious abuses of diversity jurisdiction”); Felix Frankfurter
& James M. Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court of the United States—A Study in
the Federal Judicial System, 40 HARV. L. REV. 834, 871 (1927) (arguing that any attempt
to relieve an overburdened federal judiciary may result in reexamination of the justification
for diversity jurisdiction).
60
Braverman, supra note 8, at 1096–1102 (asserting that “Justice Frankfurter’s deep
hostility toward diversity jurisdiction led him to questionable interpretations of Supreme
Court precedents [in City of Indianapolis] and to a rule that enabled the Court to dismiss a
case that properly belonged in federal court”); Everette, supra note 8, at 1994 (noting that
“Justice Frankfurter, the author of the majority opinion in [City of] Indianapolis, opposed
diversity jurisdiction throughout his tenure and attempted to place limits upon it”);
Sherkow, supra note 8, at 531, 533 (noting that Justice Frankfurter “was a frequent
academic contributor to attacks on diversity jurisdiction” and that the Court “may have seen
realignment . . . as an attractive tool with which to control diversity jurisdiction”).
61
City of Indianapolis v. Chase Nat’l Bank, 314 U.S. 63, 70 (1941) (citing cases and
noting that “familiar doctrines governing the alignment of parties for purposes of
determining diversity of citizenship have consistently guided the lower federal courts and
this Court”).
62
Id. at 69–70 (citing Niles-Bement-Pond Co. v. Iron Moulders’ Union, 254 U.S. 77
(1920); Helm v. Zarecor, 222 U.S. 32 (1911); City of Dawson v. Columbia Ave. Sav. Fund,
Safe Deposit, Title & Trust Co., 197 U.S. 178 (1905); Merchants’ Cotton Press & Storage
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Strawbridge v. Curtiss,63 was cited solely in support of the complete diversity
requirement64 and thus adds nothing to our discussion. However, a brief look at the
remaining five decisions is helpful because the examination suggests that the City
of Indianapolis majority stretched these cited precedents in its attempt to proffer
them as supporting authority for the principal-purpose test.
East Tennessee, Virginia & Georgia Railroad Co. v. Grayson65 involved a
minority shareholder who sought to set aside a lease that arguably exceeded the
corporation’s corporate powers and prevented a settlement payment that would
have cancelled the lease.66 The East Tennessee Court specifically referred to “[t]he
principal purpose of the suit”67 in its analysis, and thus the case indeed supports
the City of Indianapolis majority’s position.
In another decision, Helm v. Zarecor,68 the Court reversed the district court’s
realignment of a corporate party from defendant to plaintiff, even though the
corporation’s board agreed with the position of the plaintiffs. The Court stated that
“the relation of the corporation to the controversy is not to be determined by the
attitude of alleged members of the Board . . . . These do not suffice to identify the
interest of the corporation with that of the complainants.”69 Helm makes no
specific mention of examining the principal purpose of the litigation, but the Court
refers twice to “the controversy”70 and also to “the object of their suit,”71 which
suggests that there was only one controversy—and accordingly, that no inquiry
into the litigation’s principal purpose would have been necessary.
Another case, City of Dawson v. Columbia Avenue Saving Fund, Safe
Deposit, Title & Trust Co.,72 involved a realignment of the parties due to an
improper creation of diversity jurisdiction. As characterized by the Supreme
Court,

Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 151 U.S. 368 (1894); E. Tenn., Va. & Ga. R.R. v. Grayson, 119
U.S. 240 (1886)). The majority discussed an additional case at length later in its opinion.
Id. at 75 n.4 (discussing Sutton v. English, 246 U.S. 199 (1918)). Accordingly, we address
that additional case later in this section. See infra notes 86–88 and accompanying text.
63
7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
64
City of Indianapolis, 314 U.S. at 69 (citing Strawbridge for the proposition that
diversity jurisdiction requires a “controversy between citizens of different states, all of
whom on one side of the controversy are citizens of different states from all parties on the
other side”).
65
119 U.S. 240 (1886).
66
Id. at 243.
67
Id. at 244.
68
222 U.S. 32 (1911).
69
Id. at 38.
70
Id. at 33, 37 (emphasis added).
71
Id. at 37 (emphasis added).
72
197 U.S. 178 (1905).
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it is obvious that the Water Works Company is on the plaintiff’s side and
was made a defendant solely for the purpose of reopening in the United
States Court a controversy which had been decided against it in the
courts of the State. . . . [W]hen the arrangement of the parties is merely a
contrivance between friends for the purpose of founding a jurisdiction
which otherwise would not exist, the device cannot be allowed to
succeed.73
However, City of Dawson concluded that “[n]o difference or collision of
interest or action is alleged or even suggested”74 without mention of the principal
purpose—language implying that had any collision of interest existed, the Court
would not have realigned the parties. In City of Indianapolis, the Court accurately
cites City of Dawson for its “necessary ‘collision of interest’” language.75
However, the majority also cites City of Dawson to support its conclusion,76
suggesting that the majority considered City of Dawson to require an examination
of the principal purpose of the litigation77—which it does not.
The City of Indianapolis majority also cited Niles-Bement-Pond Co. v. Iron
Moulders Union.78 In this case, the Court concluded that one of the defendants,
Niles Tool Works Company, was essentially a subsidiary of the plaintiff, NilesBement-Pond, such that, as the circuit court of appeals found, “its interest in the
controversy was so certainly on the same side, that it should be treated as a
plaintiff.”79 In reaching that conclusion, the Supreme Court stated that because
Niles-Bement-Pond held the majority of the tool company’s stock, “any
substantial controversy” between the two was impossible. City of Indianapolis
cited Niles-Bement-Pond as requiring a substantial controversy, which it did.80
Again, however, Niles-Bement-Pond mentions only the necessity of a substantial
controversy, making no mention of the litigation’s principal purpose. To that
extent, the citation is arguably misleading as supporting authority for the
principal-purpose test.81

73

Id. at 180–81.
Id. at 181.
75
City of Indianapolis v. Chase Nat’l Bank, 314 U.S. 63, 69 (1941) (quoting City of
Dawson v. Columbia Ave. Sav. Fund, Safe Deposit, Title & Trust Co., 197 U.S. 178, 181
(1905)).
76
City of Indianapolis, 314 U.S. at 74–75 & n.4.
77
See Braverman, supra note 8, at 1108–09 (stating that Justice Frankfurter
“misconstrued precedent in declaring that judges must look only to the primary purpose of
the suit” and using City of Dawson as an example).
78
254 U.S. 77 (1920).
79
Id. at 78.
80
City of Indianapolis, 314 U.S. at 69.
81
See Braverman, supra note 8, at 1107 (“The Niles-Bement-Pond Court’s use of the
phrase ‘any substantial controversy’ suggests that there might have been more than one
74
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The remaining cited case, Merchants’ Cotton-Press & Storage Co. v.
Insurance Co. of North America,82 involved realignment in the context of removal.
The case indeed refers to the potential for arranging parties “on opposite sides of
the primary and controlling matter in dispute.”83 However, despite that reference,
the Court analyzed all of the matters in the litigation, ultimately concluding that
removal of the case from state to federal court was improper under any potential
configuration.84 Accordingly, it appears that only one of the five cases cited by the
City of Indianapolis majority in setting forth its realignment standard truly
required that parties be aligned solely according to the principal purpose of the
lawsuit.85
We examine one additional case here because the City of Indianapolis
majority cited it elsewhere in its opinion, as did the dissent. Sutton v. English86
was a suit to set aside a will and distribute property among the testator’s heirs. The
Supreme Court found the district court’s realignment of a party from defendant to
plaintiff improper, even though the Court observed that the defendant’s interest
was the same as the plaintiffs’ with respect to three of the four objects of the
litigation. The Court noted that before the district court could reach the three
common interests, the remaining claim had to first be addressed—“and with
respect to this her interest was altogether adverse to [the plaintiffs]. Therefore she
was properly made a party defendant, that being her attitude towards the actual
and substantial controversy.”87 As characterized by one commentator, Sutton
offered something for everyone:
To the majority in City of Indianapolis, the Sutton case was a clear
holding that parties must be aligned according to their attitude toward
the actual controversy, while the dissenters found comfort in the fact that
the Court in Sutton held it error to align one of the defendants with the
plaintiff when that defendant’s interest was adverse to the plaintiff on
only one out of four issues.88

controversy between pleaded adversaries that would justify maintaining their position on
opposite sides of the controversy.”).
82
151 U.S. 368 (1894).
83
Id. at 385.
84
See id. at 385–87; see also Braverman, supra note 8, at 1108 (noting that
“Merchants’ Cotton-Press does not require, as [Justice] Frankfurter concluded it did, that
courts must first identify a single primary and controlling issue and arrange the parties
accordingly”).
85
See E. Tenn., Va. & Ga. R.R. v. Grayson, 119 U.S. 240, 243–44 (1886).
86
246 U.S. 199 (1918).
87
Id. at 204.
88
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 8, at § 3607, at 325 (alteration in original) (footnote
omitted).

2014]

REALIGNING PARTIES

125

In sum, one could argue that the City of Indianapolis majority stretched its
cited precedents in mandating that the propriety of realignment must be
ascertained from the lawsuit’s principal purpose. This is particularly true because
the only cited case expressly employing the principal-purpose test was the oldest
of the five decisions;89 the four more recent decisions reflected a retreat from that
approach.
From here, we turn to the majority’s final and fatal flaw: its disregard of
realignment’s ultimate purpose in ensuring the adversity necessary to the
constitutional case-or-controversy requirement. Accordingly, the following Part
analyzes the purposes and underpinnings of the federal doctrine of realignment
and, in doing so, reestablishes realignment’s constitutional foundation.
IV. REALIGNMENT’S PURPOSES AND CONSTITUTIONAL UNDERPINNINGS
In its paragraph describing the governing principles of realignment, the City
of Indianapolis majority’s repeated use of “diversity jurisdiction” rather than
“realignment” highlights the ultimate relationship of realignment to jurisdiction
but unfortunately does so in a misleading fashion. As this Part will explain,
realignment’s purpose and constitutional underpinnings lie in ensuring that a
lawsuit satisfies the case-or-controversy requirement,90 which is an issue of
justiciability rather than jurisdiction.91
89

Compare E. Tenn., Va. & Ga. R.R. v. Grayson, 119 U.S. 240 (1886) (employing
the principal-purpose test), with Niles-Bement-Pond Co. v. Iron Moulders’ Union, 254 U.S.
77, 79 (1920) (requiring a substantial controversy), Helm v. Zarecor, 222 U.S. 32, 33, 37
(1911) (referring to “the controversy” and the “object of the suit”), City of Dawson v.
Columbia Ave. Sav. Fund, Safe Deposit, Title & Trust Co., 197 U.S. 178, 181 (1905)
(stating a “collision of interest” standard would prevent realignment), and Merchants’
Cotton-Press & Storage Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 151 U.S. 368, 385 (1894) (noting the
potential for arranging parties “on opposite sides of the primary and controlling matter in
dispute”).
90
See infra notes 92–118 and accompanying text.
91
Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 120 (2003) (referring to the “limitations of a case
or controversy or other federal rules of justiciability”) (quoting ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish,
490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989)). As explained in Flast v. Cohen:
Embodied in the words “cases” and “controversies” are two complementary but
somewhat different limitations. In part those words limit the business of federal
courts to questions presented in an adversary context and in a form historically
viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial process. And in part those
words define the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power
to assure that the federal courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other
branches of government. Justiciability is the term of art employed to give
expression to this dual limitation placed upon federal courts by the case-orcontroversy doctrine.
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Theoretically, the federal courts could have adopted an absolutist “plaintiff as
master of the claim” approach, whereby the plaintiff’s configuration of the
litigation would have been unassailable. But the federal courts have declined to
take such an approach, instead choosing to authorize the option of party
realignment in federal cases. This option better serves realignment’s purpose,
which is rooted in the Constitution’s case-or-controversy requirement.92
A logical starting point in discussing the case-or-controversy requirement is
the meaning of the phrase “case or controversy.” There is support in both case
law93 and legal commentary94 for the notion that “case” is a broader term than
“controversy.” Although some have dissented from that view,95 we need not tarry
long over any possible distinction in definition; the significant point for our
purposes is that “more than three hundred years of legal practice and tradition

392 U.S. 83, 94–95 (1968); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975) (defining
justiciability as “whether the plaintiff has made out a ‘case or controversy’ between himself
and the defendant within the meaning of Art. III”). Viewing the jurisdiction/justiciability
distinction in another context, the Supreme Court has explained that the constitutional
conferral of federal subject-matter jurisdiction within Article III, Section 2 over lawsuits in
which one state is suing another state is only one part of the inquiry:
By the Judiciary Article of the Constitution, the judicial power extends to
controversies between states, and this Court is given original jurisdiction of
cases in which a state shall be a party. The present suit is between states, and the
other jurisdictional requirements being satisfied, . . . our constitutional authority
to hear the case and grant relief turns on the question whether the issue framed
by the pleadings constitutes a justiciable “case” or “controversy’” within the
meaning of the Constitutional provision . . . .
Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398, 405 (1939) (citations omitted).
92
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
93
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239–41 (1937); Muskrat v. United
States, 219 U.S. 346, 356–57 (1911); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 431, 432
(1793); In re Pac. Ry. Comm’n, 32 F. 241, 255 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1887).
94
See, e.g., William A. Fletcher, The “Case or Controversy” Requirement in State
Court Adjudication of Federal Questions, 78 CAL. L. REV. 263, 266 (1990) (noting that
historically, “[t]he term ‘case’ referred to ‘all cases, whether civil or criminal.’ The term
‘controversy’ meant only disputes ‘of a civil nature.’”) (quoting 1 ST. GEORGE TUCKER,
BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE app. note E at 420−21
(Philadelphia 1803), available at http://www.lonang.com/exlibris/tucker/tuck-1e.htm)
(emphasis omitted).
95
See, e.g., Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Article III’s Case/Controversy Distinction and the
Dual Functions of Federal Courts, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 460 (1994); Martin H.
Redish, Text, Structure, and Common Sense in the Interpretation of Article III, 138 U. PA.
L. REV. 1633, 1636 (1990); Martin H. Redish & Andrianna D. Kastanek, Settlement Class
Actions, the Case-or-Controversy Requirement, and the Nature of the Adjudicatory
Process, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 545, 566 (2006).
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establish a presumption that the word ‘case,’ like the word ‘controversy,’ requires
an adversarial suit.”96
The legal commentary occasionally has overlooked the necessity for an
adversarial context,97 perhaps due to other, more colorful and complicated
justiciability doctrines, such as standing, mootness, ripeness, and political
questions.98 Fortunately, however, the Supreme Court and some prominent
commentators have provided an ample foundation for our discussion.
As noted above, the case-or-controversy requirement is a doctrine of
justiciability rather than jurisdiction.99 Justiciability is distinct from jurisdiction,100
96

Redish & Kastanek, supra note 95, at 565; see id. at 548 (“There is simply no
rational means of defining the terms ‘case’ or ‘controversy’ to include a proceeding in
which, from the outset, nothing is disputed and the parties are in complete agreement.”).
97
See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the
“Case or Controversy” Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297 (1979) (discussing the “case
or controversy” requirement by means of exploring standing, mootness, and ripeness, but
not discussing the adversarial requirement).
98
See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006) (noting that
standing, mootness, ripeness, and political questions all originate in the case or controversy
language); William R. Casto, Foreign Affairs Crises and the Constitution’s Case or
Controversy Limitation: Notes from the Founding Era, 46 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 237, 237
(2004) (mentioning standing, mootness, advisory opinions, ripeness, and political questions
as within the case-or-controversy requirement). But see Recent Developments,
Construction of Immigration Act in Advance of Enforcement Denied for Lack of Case or
Controversy, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 1144, 1144 (1954) [hereinafter Construction of
Immigration Act] (“[T]he constitutional limitation that courts created by Article III may
decide only cases or controversies operates to eliminate from the deliberation of these
courts all cases deemed moot, advisory, non-adversary, or overly hypothetical . . . .”)
(emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
Although the Supreme Court expressly refers to the ban on advisory
opinions less frequently than the other justiciability doctrines, this should not be
taken as an indication that it is less important. Quite the contrary, it is because
the prohibition of advisory opinions is at the core of Article III that the other
justiciability doctrines exist largely to ensure that federal courts will not issue
advisory opinions. That is, it is because standing, ripeness, and mootness
implement the policies and requirements contained in the advisory opinion
doctrine that it is usually unnecessary for the Court to separately address the ban
on advisory opinions.
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 2.2, at 54 (6th ed. 2012).
99
See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
100
Eric Berger, The Collision of the Takings and State Sovereign Immunity Doctrines,
63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 493, 529−30 (2006) (“Our judiciary considers distinct such
concepts as cause of action, jurisdiction (both personal and subject matter), [and]
justiciability, . . . and satisfying judicial requirements in one category often will have no
effect on another.”).
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and as the Supreme Court explained in Baker v. Carr,101 this distinction “is
significant.”102 The necessity of an adversarial context is part of the firmly
established prohibition against the federal courts’ issuance of advisory opinions:103
“[F]or a case to be justiciable, and for it not to be a request for an advisory
opinion, there must be an actual dispute between adverse litigants . . . .”104 The
Supreme Court has given further explanation:
The Constitution [Article III, Section 2] limits the exercise of the
judicial power to “cases” and “controversies.” . . .
A “controversy” in this sense must be one that is appropriate for
judicial determination. . . . The controversy must be definite and
concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal
interests.105
The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the adversarial context is crucial to
satisfying the case-or-controversy requirement.106 “The Court has found unfit for
101

369 U.S. 186 (1962).
Id. at 198. “A federal court cannot ‘pronounce any statute, either of a state or of the
United States, void, because irreconcilable with the constitution, except as it is called upon
to adjudge the legal rights of litigants in actual controversies.’” Id. at 204 (quoting
Liverpool, N.Y. & Phila. Steam-Ship Co. v. Comm’rs of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39
(1885)).
103
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 98, § 2.2, at 46–47.
102

[T]he justiciability doctrines are intended to improve judicial decision making by
providing the federal courts with concrete controversies best suited for judicial
resolution. . . . [T]he requirement for cases and controversies “limit[s] the
business of federal courts to questions presented in an adversary context . . . .”
Because federal courts have limited ability to conduct independent
investigations, they must depend on the parties to fully present all relevant
information to them. It is thought that adverse parties, with a stake in the
outcome of the litigation, will perform this task best.
Id. at 44; see also id. § 2.2, at 46 (“The core of Article III’s limitation on federal judicial
power is that federal courts cannot issue advisory opinions.”); see id. § 2.2, at 52–54
(discussing whether declaratory judgments constitute “impermissible advisory opinions”).
104
Id. § 2.2, at 52.
105
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239−41 (1937).
106
See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968) (noting that cases before the
federal courts must be “presented in an adversary context”); United States v. Johnson, 319
U.S. 302, 304 (1943) (refusing to reach the merits of the case because there was no
“genuine adversary issue between the parties” as mandated by the case-or-controversy
requirement); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 361−62 (1911) (concluding that the
defendant—the U.S. Government—had “no interest adverse to the claimants,” and thus the
case presented no justiciable controversy); Lord v. Veazie, 49 U.S. 251, 254−55 (1850) (if
the parties’ interests are “one and the same,” they do not present a justiciable case). See
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adjudication any cause that is not in any real sense adversary, [and] that does not
assume the honest and actual antagonistic assertion of rights to be
adjudicated . . . .”107 As one law review article has noted, “The Court has widely
held that the case-or-controversy language of Article III mandates litigant
adverseness. For a suit to be justiciable, according to the Court, the parties must
maintain ‘adverse legal interests’ throughout, and their dispute must be ‘definite
and concrete.’”108
Other legal commentary, as one might expect in light of the Supreme Court’s
consistency on this issue, has also supported this view. As noted in a 1927
Harvard Law Review article, “The first essential of a case or controversy is that
there be interested parties asserting adverse claims.”109 A 1954 Columbia Law
Review article echoed, “The case or controversy limitation . . . requires that a
concrete problem be presented to the court by parties actually in dispute.”110
Professors Martin Redish and Andrianna Kastanek have addressed the
centrality of litigant adverseness to the case-or-controversy requirement in the
context of settlement class actions, stating that “[a]ccording to both textual and
doctrinal interpretations of Article III, the case-or-controversy requirement
unambiguously mandates the existence of an adversarial relationship between
opposing litigants.”111 These commentators also noted that the case or
controversy’s adverseness requirement has a long reach: “For purposes of Article
III’s adverseness requirement, . . . the term [‘collusion’] has a [broad] meaning. It
includes any suit in which, from the outset, the parties are in agreement as to the
outcome.”112
Whether phrased as “actual and adversary,”113 “an adversary context,”114
“adverse legal interests,”115 or “litigant adverseness,”116 the case-or-controversy
requirement clearly requires adversity in the parties’ legal positions. Both the
adoption of an adversarial (as contrasted with an inquisitorial) system117 and the
Redish & Kastanek, supra note 95, at 548 (“[F]rom both historical and doctrinal
perspectives, Supreme Court decisions could not be more certain that Article III is satisfied
only when the parties are truly ‘adverse’ to one another . . . .”).
107
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 505 (1961) (internal quotation marks omitted).
108
Redish & Kastanek, supra note 95, at 567 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Aetna Life
Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240−41).
109
Note, What Constitutes a Case or Controversy Within the Meaning of Article III of
the Constitution, 41 HARV. L. REV. 225, 233 (1927).
110
Construction of Immigration Act, supra note 98, at 1144−45.
111
Redish & Kastanek, supra note 95, at 570.
112
Id. at 551.
113
Coffman v. Breeze Corp., 323 U.S. 316, 324 (1945) (citations omitted).
114
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968).
115
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240–41 (1937).
116
Redish & Kastanek, supra note 95, at 567.
117
Id. at 571 (“[L]itigant adverseness serves as an essential ingredient in the
protections and incentives upon which the adversary system depends, including the creation
of a well-balanced, well-developed record to facilitate informed judicial decisionmaking.”);
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reliance on precedent and preclusion doctrines118 render logical the requirement of
an adversarial relationship between litigating parties. This necessity of adverse
legal interests is not restricted to diversity cases but is instead required in all
federal cases, regardless of the basis for federal subject-matter jurisdiction.
For lawsuits founded on diversity jurisdiction, the joinder of parties must be
legitimate—there must be a “real cause of action . . . asserted against [the
defendant] by the plaintiff.”119 Indeed, requiring legitimate diversity of citizenship
and avoiding the improper manipulation of diversity jurisdiction is crucial to
sustaining the validity of the federal courts. However, realignment is not the only
means of achieving legitimate diversity of citizenship; several alternatives protect
the integrity of diversity jurisdiction. For example, Section 1359 prohibits
improper or collusive joinder designed to create diversity jurisdiction. In addition,
fraudulent joinder authorizes federal courts to look beyond the face of the
complaint to ensure that the plaintiff has a colorable claim against a nondiverse
defendant. If not, the citizenship of that nondiverse defendant is disregarded,
permitting the case to proceed in federal court.120
In sum, the federal courts’ power to realign parties furthers the constitutional
case-or-controversy requirement by ensuring that the parties are aligned so as to
have the requisite adverse legal interests; indeed, this is the very purpose of
realignment. For this reason, the doctrine of realignment potentially can be
invoked in any federal lawsuit rather than being restricted solely to diversity
cases121—the federal court can realign the parties to ensure adverse legal interests
even when, as in the instance of arising-under cases, realignment has no impact
whatsoever on the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. Characterizing realignment
as within the rubric of jurisdiction generally, or diversity jurisdiction specifically,
is therefore inaccurate.
The underdevelopment of the doctrine of realignment as a crucial tool for
ensuring the existence of a case or controversy in federal court is a serious

id. at 572 (“The requirement that litigants on opposite sides have ‘adverse’ legal interests
for a suit to be justiciable is appropriately viewed as a logical outgrowth of the nation’s
commitment to an adversary system.”).
118
Id. at 576–82. “[T]he case-or-controversy requirement demands true adverseness
between opposing litigants at the outset of suit, because absent such adverseness we cannot
be assured that the litigants will effectively protect the interests of affected individuals not
currently before the court.” Id. at 580.
119
City of Indianapolis v. Chase Nat’l Bank, 314 U.S. 63, 80 (1941) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting).
120
See Sherkow, supra note 8, at 553–59 (advocating for the abolition of the
realignment doctrine, as well as discussing how amendments to Section 1359 and the
fraudulent joinder doctrine may be used by the courts to limit fraudulent or improper
joinders in diversity cases and how courts may expand the concept of direct action under
Section 1332(c)(1) to deny realignment where realignment itself creates a direct action).
121
See supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of alignment in
federal-question and diversity cases alike).
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omission in federal court jurisprudence. It is to this task that we now turn.
Accordingly, our next step is to set forth the appropriate approach to realigning
parties—an approach that both is practical and pays proper homage to
realignment’s constitutional purpose.
V. A PROPOSAL FOR DETERMINING WHEN REALIGNMENT IS APPROPRIATE
The ultimate issue in realignment is whether the lawsuit, as configured,
satisfies the constitutional case-or-controversy requirement. In other words, the
federal court must determine whether the parties possess sufficiently adverse legal
interests such that the court has the constitutional power to hear the case.
However, out of 362 federal decisions addressing realignment since the City of
Indianapolis decision, only fourteen have noted realignment’s relationship to the
case-or-controversy requirement.122 Moreover, twelve of the fourteen decisions
mentioning the case-or-controversy requirement in the context of realignment
mentioned the constitutional doctrine only in passing.123 Thus, even those courts
122

Searching all published federal decisions on Westlaw without a date restriction,
using the Allfeds database and the search terms “‘Indianapolis v. Chase’ & realign!”
yielded 362 cases. Revising the search terms to “‘Indianapolis v. Chase’ and ‘case or
controversy’ w/20 realign!” yielded fourteen cases.
123
Md. Cas. Co. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 23 F.3d 617, 622 (2d Cir. 1993) (quoting a
single sentence from 1 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 0.74[1], at
771 (2d ed. 1993) but no other reference to, or analysis of, the case or controversy
requirement); see also Cal. Cas. Gen. Ins. Co. v. Nelson, No. 13-0773-CV-W-ODS, 2013
WL 6410637 at *1 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 9, 2013) (mentioning the case-or-controversy
relationship in a single sentence without further analysis); Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Emjay
Envtl. Recycling, Ltd., No. 09–CV–1322, 2012 WL 976056 at *4–5 (E.D.N.Y. March 19,
2012) (simply citing MOORE, supra, for the constitutional standard for alignment); Kucher
v. Exceeding Expectations, Inc., No. 1:12–CV–00169, 2012 WL 1802311 at *2 (N.D.N.Y.
May 17, 2012) (same); Portfolio Recovery Assocs., L.L.C. v. Harstad, No. 2:11-CV-04185NKL, 2011 WL 5526043 at *3 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 14, 2011) (mentioning the case-orcontroversy relationship in a single sentence without further analysis); Gurney’s Inn Resort
& Spa Ltd. v. Benjamin, 743 F. Supp. 2d 117, 121 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (same); Wheat v. U.S.
Trust Co., N.A., No. 3:08–CV–635, 2008 WL 4829840 at *2 (D. Conn. Nov. 4, 2008)
(same); Steele v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., No. 07–60789–CIV, 2007 WL 3458543 at *4
(S.D. Fla. Nov. 14, 2007) (mentioning the case-or-controversy relationship in a single
sentence without any other reference or analysis); McCleary v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., No.
01–0839–CV–W–3–ECF, 2001 WL 1339412 at *1 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 17, 2001) (noting “the
Constitutional requirement of an actual case or controversy between the parties” without
more); Fed. Ins. Co. v. Bill Harbert Constr. Co., 82 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1334 (S.D. Ala.
1999) (noting that realignment’s purpose is to ensure there is a “true case or controversy”
without more); Fed. Ins. Co. v. Safeskin Corp., No. 98–CIV–2194, 1998 WL 832706 at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 1998) (quoting MOORE, supra, without more); Still v. DeBuono, 927 F.
Supp. 125, 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (noting that realignment “derives from the Constitution’s
cases and controversies limitation” without more). The Northern District of Georgia
provided a bit more analysis in a 2003 case:
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correctly identifying the constitutional underpinnings of the doctrine of
realignment typically have failed to recognize the full significance of those
underpinnings. We propose a solution.
Both courts124 and commentators125 have found reasons to criticize City of
Indianapolis, but our concerns come from a different perspective: City of
The need for adversity between plaintiffs and defendants stems not merely from
the federal diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332—or, for that matter, from any
legislative enactment—but more fundamentally from U.S. Const. art. III[’s case
or controversy requirement]. . . . It is for this reason that the need to assess the
alignment of parties is equally strong in federal question cases like this one as it
is in those premised on diversity jurisdiction.
Larios v. Perdue, 306 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1196–97 (N.D. Ga. 2003). The District of Nevada
also devoted slightly more discussion than most in a 1990 decision: “[City of
Indianapolis’s] holding was premised on the requirement that federal courts only consider
matters where there is a true case or controversy among the parties. U.S. CONST. art. III,
§ 2. In other words, realignment doctrine is, at its foundation, concerned with the
constitutional ban on advisory opinions.” Nev. Eighty-Eight, Inc. v. Title Ins. Co., 753 F.
Supp. 1516, 1525 (D. Nev. 1990). Although the second edition of Moore’s Federal
Practice, cited in several of the cases above (as indicated parenthetically), indeed referred
to the case-or-controversy requirement, the subsequent third edition does not, instead
discussing realignment only in the diversity context. Compare 1 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL.,
MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 0.74[1], at 771 (2d ed. 1993), with 15 MOORE, supra note
8, §§ 102.20, 102.21[6], and 16 MOORE, supra note 8, § 107.14[2][c][vi].
124
See, e.g., Md. Cas. Co. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 23 F.3d 617, 622–23 (2d Cir. 1993)
(arguing that City of Indianapolis did not require the principal-purpose test).
The primary purpose approach is not actually dictated by Indianapolis
because though the facts of that case involved only a single controversy among
the litigants involving the enforceability of a 99-year lease, the Supreme Court
did not intend that all cases be forced into a single-issue posture. Indianapolis
deliberately considered additional, subordinate controversies raised by the
parties opposed to realignment and found that they were in fact non-issues. Such
discussion would have been wholly irrelevant were the realignment inquiry to
concern only the primary purpose of the litigation.
Id. at 622–23 (citations omitted); see also Travelers Indem. Co. v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 798
F. Supp. 156, 158–59 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (contending that the distinctive context of City of
Indianapolis led to the more ready application of the principal-purpose test).
Justice Frankfurter unquestionably stated that the finding of collision must
relate to the “primary and controlling matter in dispute.” However, in that
particular case, unlike some others, there was an identifiable primary and
controlling matter in dispute as to which opposing parties had the same interests.
Justice Frankfurter noted that the interests of two parties (although they were
pleaded on adverse sides) turned identically on the validity or invalidity of a
lease. . . .
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Indianapolis fails even to mention, much less to integrate, the constitutional caseor-controversy requirement upon which the doctrine of realignment is based. The
melding of the Court’s realignment analysis with diversity jurisdiction in City of
Indianapolis created an analytically unsound foundation for applying the doctrine.
Federal courts, when facing motions to realign the parties, should focus on
the constitutional case-or-controversy requirement as the foundation of the
doctrine of realignment.126 In evaluating the propriety of realignment, federal
courts should apply a standard that is well established, commonly used, and
specific to determining whether the case-or-controversy requirement is satisfied:
specifically, federal courts should apply the standard used to ensure that the
parties are not seeking an advisory opinion, as is most commonly seen in the
context of declaratory judgment actions.

Although Justice Frankfurter seems to assert that the adversity must relate
to the primary issue in dispute, he, nonetheless, in footnote 3, explored whether
there were other matters in controversy between the two questioned parties that
would justify regarding them as adversaries. He found that there were not.
Id. at 158.
125
See, e.g., Braverman, supra note 8, at 1096 (arguing that one of the reasons for the
confusion resulting from City of Indianapolis was that “Justice Frankfurter’s deep hostility
toward diversity jurisdiction led him to questionable interpretations of Supreme Court
precedents and to a rule that enabled the Court to dismiss a case that properly belonged in
federal court”); id. at 1119 (proposing that courts approach realignment by “(1) align[ing]
the parties with respect to the primary purpose of the suit, and (2) investigat[ing] any other
conflicts that might justify aligning the parties differently”); Everette, supra note 8, at 1994,
1996 (noting that the narrower principal purpose approach reflected “the fact that Justice
Frankfurter, the author of the majority opinion in Indianapolis, opposed diversity
jurisdiction throughout his tenure and attempted to place limits upon it” and urging the
alternative of “identifying the primary dispute and then considering whether any other
controversies warrant aligning the parties differently”); Sherkow, supra note 8, at 529
(noting “the history behind diversity jurisdiction that colored the majority opinion in
Indianapolis” and criticizing “both the principal purpose test and the substantial
controversy test as procedurally defective and unsound as a matter of policy”).
126
Two federal district court decisions offer a good starting point for such a case-orcontroversy discussion. In the first, the court rejected the defendant’s attempt to assert a
third-party impleader claim for lack of derivative liability, and then rejected the defendant’s
urging that the court simply realign the parties, stating that, with respect to the request for
realignment, “[the defendant’s] request falls outside the scope of the realignment doctrine’s
purpose, which is to prevent unconstitutional advisory opinions by ensuring that a true case
or controversy exists between the parties.” Portfolio Recovery Assocs., 2011 WL 5526043,
at *3. In the second, the court notes that realignment is “premised on the requirement that
federal courts only consider matters where there is a true case or controversy among the
parties. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. In other words, realignment doctrine is, at its foundation,
concerned with the constitutional ban on advisory opinions.” Nev. Eighty-Eight, 753 F.
Supp. at 1525.
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Before the passage of the federal Declaratory Judgment Act in 1934,127 the
Supreme Court had expressed concern about the ability of the federal courts to
entertain declaratory judgment actions.128 The Court’s concern lay in the potential
that a declaratory judgment action might not present the requisite adversary
context and therefore constitute an advisory opinion, which would not comport
with the Constitution’s case-or-controversy requirement.129 In 1933, the Court
backed away from an absolute prohibition against hearing declaratory judgment
actions, stating that such actions would be justiciable “so long as the case retains
the essentials of an adversary proceeding, involving a real, not a hypothetical,
controversy.”130
The next year, Congress passed the federal Declaratory Judgment Act,131
addressing the Court’s justiciability concern by inserting the phrase “[i]n a case of
actual controversy” at the outset of the declaratory judgment statute, intending
thereby “to ensure that the declaratory judgment action be confined to cases within
the constitutional boundaries of the case-and-controversy clause.”132 The Supreme
Court upheld the Act’s constitutionality in 1937.133 Thus, in the context of
declaratory judgment actions, the federal courts have long been required to
evaluate whether an “actual controversy” has been presented, due to the presence
of that language in the federal Declaratory Judgment Act.134
An identical concern underlies both the doctrine of realignment and
declaratory judgment actions—that of ensuring the requisite adversity necessitated
by the constitutional case-or-controversy requirement. In ensuring that a case is
justiciable and not an advisory opinion, there must be an actual dispute between
adverse litigants.135 Thus, in the context of declaratory judgment actions, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly and consistently held that the case-or-controversy
127

28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2006).
See Piedmont & N. Ry. v. United States, 280 U.S. 469, 477 (1930); Willing v. Chi.
Auditorium Ass’n, 277 U.S. 274, 289 (1928).
129
See, e.g., Alabama v. Arizona, 291 U.S. 286, 291 (1934) (“This Court may not be
called on to give advisory opinions or to pronounce declaratory judgments.”); Willing, 277
U.S. at 289 (holding that a declaratory judgment action should have been dismissed
because it did not present “a case or controversy within the meaning of Article III”).
130
Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249, 264 (1933).
131
See 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a).
132
Donald L. Doernberg & Michael B. Mushlin, The Trojan Horse: How the
Declaratory Judgment Act Created a Cause of Action and Expanded Federal Jurisdiction
While the Supreme Court Wasn’t Looking, 36 UCLA L. REV. 529, 549 (1989); see also
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007) (“[T]he phrase ‘case of
actual controversy’ in the [Declaratory Judgment] Act refers to the type of ‘Cases’ and
‘Controversies’ that are justiciable under Article III.”).
133
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937).
134
28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (authorizing actions for declaratory relief in the federal courts
“[i]n a case of actual controversy”).
135
See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 103, § 2.2 (discussing the need for a
controversy between adverse parties).
128
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requirement is satisfied when there is “a substantial controversy, between parties
having adverse legal interests.”136
Indeed, in 2007, the Supreme Court specifically addressed the appropriate
standard for reviewing declaratory judgment actions for compliance with the
constitutional case-or-controversy requirement.137 The Court declined to establish
a bright-line rule, instead instructing the federal courts to look at all the
circumstances:
Aetna [Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth] and the cases following it do
not draw the brightest of lines between those declaratory-judgment
actions that satisfy the case-or-controversy requirement and those that do
not. Our decisions have required that the dispute be “definite and
concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal
interests”; and that it be “real and substantial” and “admi[t] of specific
relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished from
an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of
facts.” In Maryland Casualty Co v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., we
summarized as follows: “Basically, the question in each case is whether
the facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show that there is a
substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests,
of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a
declaratory judgment.”138
In the realignment context, the application of this standard would require the
federal court to examine whether the facts alleged, under all the circumstances,
show that there is a substantial controversy between parties having adverse legal
interests. Under this approach, courts would address any concerns specific to a
136

MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 127 (quoting Md. Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312
U.S. 270, 273 (1941)).
137
MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 126–28.
138
Id. at 127 (citations omitted) (quoting Md. Cas., 312 U.S. at 273; Aetna Life Ins.,
300 U.S. at 240–41).
For there to be an “actual controversy” cognizable under the Declaratory
Judgment Act and Article III, a dispute must be “definite and concrete, touching
the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests.” The dispute must
“admit[] of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as
distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a
hypothetical state of facts.”
Kevin C. Walsh, The Ghost that Slayed the Mandate, 64 STAN. L. REV. 55, 67 (2012)
(footnotes omitted) (quoting Aetna Life Ins., 300 U.S. at 240–41); see also Streck, Inc. v.
Research & Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 665 F.3d 1269, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“After
MedImmune, courts must look at ‘all the circumstances’ to determine whether a declaratory
judgment plaintiff has shown a case or controversy between the parties.”).
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diversity-jurisdiction context, such as improper, collusive, or fraudulent joinder,
by resorting to existing statutory or judicially created remedies.139
This approach to the doctrine of realignment is analytically sound and easier
for the federal courts to apply. The approach is analytically sound because it rests
firmly upon the case-or-controversy foundation, drawing no artificial distinction
between federal cases being heard on the basis of diversity jurisdiction and those
based on arising-under jurisdiction. Indeed, in light of available alternatives for
improper or collusive joinder, the principal-purpose test merely burdens the
federal courts, not only by potentially requiring them to delve into the action’s
underlying merits, but also by potentially requiring them to engage in conjecture.
Moreover, this approach is easier for federal courts to apply because there are far
more applicable precedents due to the numerous federal cases employing this
approach in the declaratory-judgment context.
CONCLUSION
For more than seventy years, the federal circuit courts have struggled with the
applicable standard for determining the propriety of realignment as required by the
Supreme Court’s City of Indianapolis decision. Presenting a classic example of an
inability to see the forest for the trees, this struggle resulted from the Supreme
Court’s undue focus on the diversity-jurisdiction context of the realignment issue
in City of Indianapolis rather than on realignment’s purpose. Certainly the
doctrine of realignment is significant in diversity cases due to its potential for
divesting the federal court of subject-matter jurisdiction, but realignment is not
restricted to diversity cases. By erroneously fixating on the diversity context, the
Court unwittingly overlooked the reality that realignment ultimately is a procedure
aimed more generally at securing the adversarial context mandated by the
constitutional case-or-controversy requirement. Accordingly, the appropriate
approach to determining whether realignment is warranted lies in the standard
used in declaratory judgment actions: the case-or-controversy requirement is
satisfied when the facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show that there is a
substantial controversy between parties having adverse legal interests.

139

See Sherkow, supra note 8, at 553–59 (discussing Section 1359 and fraudulent
joinder); supra note 17–19 and accompanying text (same).

